PKI Interoperability Models (February 2005)
5. Comparative analysis
This section provides a brief comparative analysis of the available PKI interoperability models.
Root CA / Hierarchy |
Cross Certification (Mesh) |
Cross Recognition |
Bridge CA |
Certificate Trust List |
|
Brief Description |
An organised chain of CAs, run from the top down. |
CAs certify each other as peers |
CAs/PKI domains agree to recognise each other’s certificates |
A central bridge CA manages interoperability between all other CAs |
A list of trusted CAs is distributed |
Role |
Technical mechanism to convey recognition. |
Technical mechanism to convey recognition. May also have role in establishing recognition. |
Political and contractual process of establishing recognition. |
Technical mechanism to convey recognition. May also have role in managing recognition. |
Technical mechanism to convey recognition. |
Working examples |
Global – Identrus Germany – RegTP |
Asia – PAA Australia – Gatekeeper / Angus |
US Federal Bridge EU – Commercial Bridge |
EU – Government Bridge |
|
Agreement required |
Tight agreement from the beginning |
Only between CAs as needed |
Political co-operation |
Consensus of CAs to use bridge |
Only useful if publisher already has authority |
Technical interoperability – design stage |
Yes – fully interoperable |
Yes – but may require significant modifications |
PKIs remain separate at technical level |
Bridge can play a role in managing interoperability |
Requires another mechanism to establish recognition (eg Cross Recognition) |
Technical interoperability – real time operation |
Yes – fully interoperable |
Yes – fully interoperable |
Requires use of other tools (eg Trust Lists) to achieve technical interoperability |
Partial technical interoperability only – stronger if used with other tools (eg Trust Lists) |
Yes – fully interoperable |
Costs |
Low – simple, easy system |
High – each pair of CAs must go through expensive process to cross-certify |
Low-Medium – co-ordinating body must enforce rules and audit participants |
Medium – bridge CA has significant workload |
Low, but varies with modes of use |
Scalability |
Medium – short and certain certification paths back to trusted root |
Low – full mesh has n2 pairs, certification paths may be long |
Medium – no technical barriers, but challenging administrative co-ordination |
Medium-High –limiting factor is bridge workload |
High – simple, direct trust |
Security risks |
High – single breach of root brings down network, subordinate CAs must be re-certified |
Low – single breach may have no effect on others, or may fragment network |
Low – depending on level of technical integration, probably no effect on network |
Medium – breach of bridge brings down network, but participants can still operate on their own |
Medium – depending on implementation, may be lag between security breach and list update |